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On 19 June 2015 the Venice Commission issued its final opinion on the Law on government cleansing (lustration
law) of Ukraine. The Commission initiated review of the Ukrainian lustration law last autumn and adopted a
rather critical interim opinion on the law’s compliance with international standards. The Ukrainian government
partially accepted the critic and prepared draft amendments to the law. The final opinion took this draft into
account.
Compared to the interim opinion, the final document is much more favorable to the Ukraine’s lustration initiative.
One of the most interesting changes concerns the role of guilt in the lustration framework.
In its interim opinion, the Commission noted that guilt must be proven in each individual case and cannot be
presumed on the basis of the mere belonging to a category of public offices (para.104(c)). This observation
related to the lustration criteria of the law that applied the ban on access to public service to persons who used to
hold certain positions in state apparatus during Mr. Yanukovich’s presidency and/or in the period of Maidan
events (art.3(1-2)). Such ban “amounts to collective and discriminatory punishment which is incompatible with
human rights standards” (para.64).
The draft amendments did not change these provisions of the law. However, in its final opinion the Venice
Commission left the reconsideration of these lustration criteria to the discretion of the government (para.50), no
longer called them discriminatory punishment and abandoned its initial requirement on the proof of individual
guilt.
The Venice Commission did not explain the reason why its position on this issue had materially altered, giving a
de facto “green light” to the central part of Ukrainian lustration scheme. I will try to analyze this problem.
The requirements of the individual guilt and the presumption of innocence source from the resolution PACE
1096(1996) on measures to dismantle the heritage of former communist totalitarian systems. They can be found
among the criteria of lustration laws’ compatibility with a democratic state under the rule of law(para.12 of the
resolution).
The Venice Commission referred to these compatibility criteria in its 2009 amicus curiae opinion of the Albanian
lustration. Later, in the amicus curiae brief on the lustration law of Macedoniaand in the interim opinion on the
Ukrainian law on government cleansing the same criteria were characterized as the “essence” of European and
international standards in the field of lustration.
Unlike its earlier documents, the Commission’s final opinion on the Ukrainian lustration law does not mention
any standards in the field of lustration. Though the opinion cites the Resolution 1096, it does not thereafter use
its criteria in the assessment of the law.
The scope of the individual quilt criterion is not easy to conceive. What type of guilt is meant here? Is this legal
culpability? The Resolution 1096 and the Guidelines to ensure that lustration laws and similar administrative
measures comply with the requirements of a state based on the rule of law (attached to the Resolution 1096)
provide several arguments in favor of such understanding. Firstly, the Guidelines outline (para.(h)) personal
scope of lustration ban as follows: “Persons who ordered, perpetrated, or significantly aided in perpetrating
serious human rights violations”. Secondly, they specify (para.(k)) conditions for lustration of “conscious
collaborators” (of security or intelligence services of communist regimes): a) actual participation with
governmental offices in serious human rights violations; b) actual and knowing infliction of harm to others as a
result of such violations. Thirdly, paragraph (k) provides for exculpating conditions – a perpetrator a) was under
age of 18, b) in good faith voluntarily abandonedaffiliation with the relevant organisation before transition to a
democratic regime, or c) acted under compulsion.
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If the proof of individual guilt within lustration mechanisms is about legal culpability, then the ban on access to
public service is nothing else but punishment. But the Resolution 1096 and the Guidelinesdraw a clear distinction
between lustration and criminal punishment. Moreover, the Resolution 1096 (para.11) describes the targets of
lustration in words different from the above definition of the Guidelines – “persons who held high positions in the
former totalitarian communist regimes and supported them”. It can be concluded that either lustration is a kind of
punishment other than criminal one or guilt to be provenwithin lustration procedures is not related to violation of
law.
Paragraph 31 of the report containing draft resolution 1096 and the Guidelines provides an argument for the first
version: being an ‘administrative measure’, lustration can serve to evade the prohibition of retroactive criminal
laws. This observation suggests that lustration is a substitution of criminal punishment. In this concept guilt may
mean the fact of a knowing serious violation of human rights that was not a crime at the moment of its
commission.
On the contrary, the reference to the fact of holding a high position in the former regime suggests that the
individual guilt has a political, not a legal nature.
On the whole, the notion of individual guilt in the resolution 1096 and the Guidelines is far from being clear and
consistent.
The Guidelines contains some important procedural requirements, including the proof of guilt by a specifically
created independent commission(para.(a)), the admissibility of presumption of guilt of senior officials of
organisations which perpetrated serious human rights violations, provided such officials have the right to prove
their innocence (para.(h)) and prohibition of lustration solely for association with any organisation that was legal
at the time of such association (except as set out by in para. h) (para (i)).
Several issues remain open, in particular the way how the fact that an organisation perpetrated serious human
rights violations should be established and whether this fact can be fixed in law.
In its early opinions on lustration laws the Venice Commission emphasized importance of the individual guilt
criterion. Regarding the Albanian lustration the Commission noted that “sanctions are imposed on the basis of
formal criteria, <…> the mere fact of having held one of the offices listed suffices to receive a “verification
certificate B”. This means that “guilt” is not to be proven in each individual case, but will be presumed.” The
Commission specified the scope of proof: “This proof includes both his motivation <…> and his concrete
participation in the violation of human rights.” (para.106).
The amicus curiae brief of 2012 again endorsed the individual guilt requirement.In the interim opinion on the
Ukrainian law the Commission noted that individuals subject to lustration had no possibility to prove that despite
the position they had held they had not engaged in any violations of human rights and had not taken or
supported any anti-democratic measures (para. 65, 106).
But the final opinion this position has undergone a critical change. The proof of individual guilt is no longer a key
criterion of international standards in the field of lustration. The Commission has virtually abandoned this
criterion in its assessment of the law. The government was allowed to determine at its discretion the scope of
permissible presumption of guilt based on affiliation with an organisation. Finally, the Commission did not even
mention the right of those presumed guilty to prove their innocence.
This new approach allows the Ukrainian government to leave intact the core lustration criteria. Under these
criteria a person shall be barred from public service based on a mere fact of holding a certain post in the
administration of President Yanukovich for more than one year or during Maidan events. The opportunity to
prove innocence is not provided. The only exoneration available is voluntary termination of office during the
Maidan events.
Several explanations of the change in Venice Commission’s attitude towards the individual guilt requirement
could be suggested.
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The Resolution 1096 and the Guidelines address lustration in the decommunization context, while the Ukraine’s
lustration law (in this part) covers events that took place two decades after the end of communist rule. The
Commission could have concluded that due to this fact the PACE documents were inapplicable to Ukraine.
However, in reality the Commission came to anopposite conclusion (para. 18).
The Commission might have accepted the fact that both the resolution 1096 and the Guidelines were internally
inconsistent as regards the proof of guilt and chose to ignore this criterion at all. However, the final opinion does
not contain any reference to such inconsistencies.
The reduced significance of guilt can be also explained by a shift in the Commission’s understanding of
lustration’s rationale. Without the proof of individual guilt in serious violations of human rights, lustration
transforms into an instrument of political accountability for “collaboration” with an overthrown non-democratic and
repressive regime. Thewording of the final opinion could support this view.The Commission notes that one of the
challenges addressed by the law is non-democratic elites formerly loyal to President Yanukovich (para.27). It
stresses that the state has the right to exclude from the access to public positions those individuals who might
have shown themselves unworthy (sic!) of serving the society (para.30). The use of such terms as “serious
cases of mismanagement” (para.50) and a “misuse of power” (para. 111(d)) while describing the basis of
lustration implies that human rights violations are no longer the sole reason for introduction of lustration.
The Commission’s new approach, while not unprecedented in the European practice (it reminds of the ECtHR
Grand Chamber judgment in Zdanoka vs. Latvia case), virtually legitimates revolutionary justice, allowing post-
revolution governments to exclude the overthrown elites from public sector. However, even after the “green light”
of the Venice Commission, the Ukraine’s law on government cleansing will be probably scrutinized by other
international human rights bodies, including the European Court of Human Rights and the supervisory
mechanisms of the International Labour Organization.
LICENSED UNDER CC BY NC ND
SUGGESTED CITATION  Bobrinsky, Nikolai: Lustration and guilt: Evolution of the Venice Commission’s
approach, VerfBlog, 2015/7/11, http://verfassungsblog.de/lustration-and-guilt-evolution-of-the-venice-
commissions-approach/.
On 19 June 2015 the Venice Commission issued its final opinion on the Law on government cleansing (lustration
law) of Ukraine. The Commission initiated review of the Ukrainian lustration law last autumn and adopted a
rather critical interim opinion on the law’s compliance with international standards. The Ukrainian government
partially accepted the critic and prepared draft amendments to the law. The final opinion took this draft into
account.
Compared to the interim opinion, the final document is much more favorable to the Ukraine’s lustration initiative.
One of the most interesting changes concerns the role of guilt in the lustration framework.
In its interim opinion, the Commission noted that guilt must be proven in each individual case and cannot be
presumed on the basis of the mere belonging to a category of public offices (para.104(c)). This observation
related to the lustration criteria of the law that applied the ban on access to public service to persons who used to
hold certain positions in state apparatus during Mr. Yanukovich’s presidency and/or in the period of Maidan
events (art.3(1-2)). Such ban “amounts to collective and discriminatory punishment which is incompatible with
human rights standards” (para.64).
The draft amendments did not change these provisions of the law. However, in its final opinion the Venice
Commission left the reconsideration of these lustration criteria to the discretion of the government (para.50), no
longer called them discriminatory punishment and abandoned its initial requirement on the proof of individual
guilt.
The Venice Commission did not explain the reason why its position on this issue had materially altered, giving a
de facto “green light” to the central part of Ukrainian lustration scheme. I will try to analyze this problem.
3/6
The requirements of the individual guilt and the presumption of innocence source from the resolution PACE
1096(1996) on measures to dismantle the heritage of former communist totalitarian systems. They can be found
among the criteria of lustration laws’ compatibility with a democratic state under the rule of law(para.12 of the
resolution).
The Venice Commission referred to these compatibility criteria in its 2009 amicus curiae opinion of the Albanian
lustration. Later, in the amicus curiae brief on the lustration law of Macedoniaand in the interim opinion on the
Ukrainian law on government cleansing the same criteria were characterized as the “essence” of European and
international standards in the field of lustration.
Unlike its earlier documents, the Commission’s final opinion on the Ukrainian lustration law does not mention
any standards in the field of lustration. Though the opinion cites the Resolution 1096, it does not thereafter use
its criteria in the assessment of the law.
The scope of the individual quilt criterion is not easy to conceive. What type of guilt is meant here? Is this legal
culpability? The Resolution 1096 and the Guidelines to ensure that lustration laws and similar administrative
measures comply with the requirements of a state based on the rule of law (attached to the Resolution 1096)
provide several arguments in favor of such understanding. Firstly, the Guidelines outline (para.(h)) personal
scope of lustration ban as follows: “Persons who ordered, perpetrated, or significantly aided in perpetrating
serious human rights violations”. Secondly, they specify (para.(k)) conditions for lustration of “conscious
collaborators” (of security or intelligence services of communist regimes): a) actual participation with
governmental offices in serious human rights violations; b) actual and knowing infliction of harm to others as a
result of such violations. Thirdly, paragraph (k) provides for exculpating conditions – a perpetrator a) was under
age of 18, b) in good faith voluntarily abandonedaffiliation with the relevant organisation before transition to a
democratic regime, or c) acted under compulsion.
If the proof of individual guilt within lustration mechanisms is about legal culpability, then the ban on access to
public service is nothing else but punishment. But the Resolution 1096 and the Guidelinesdraw a clear distinction
between lustration and criminal punishment. Moreover, the Resolution 1096 (para.11) describes the targets of
lustration in words different from the above definition of the Guidelines – “persons who held high positions in the
former totalitarian communist regimes and supported them”. It can be concluded that either lustration is a kind of
punishment other than criminal one or guilt to be provenwithin lustration procedures is not related to violation of
law.
Paragraph 31 of the report containing draft resolution 1096 and the Guidelines provides an argument for the first
version: being an ‘administrative measure’, lustration can serve to evade the prohibition of retroactive criminal
laws. This observation suggests that lustration is a substitution of criminal punishment. In this concept guilt may
mean the fact of a knowing serious violation of human rights that was not a crime at the moment of its
commission.
On the contrary, the reference to the fact of holding a high position in the former regime suggests that the
individual guilt has a political, not a legal nature.
On the whole, the notion of individual guilt in the resolution 1096 and the Guidelines is far from being clear and
consistent.
The Guidelines contains some important procedural requirements, including the proof of guilt by a specifically
created independent commission(para.(a)), the admissibility of presumption of guilt of senior officials of
organisations which perpetrated serious human rights violations, provided such officials have the right to prove
their innocence (para.(h)) and prohibition of lustration solely for association with any organisation that was legal
at the time of such association (except as set out by in para. h) (para (i)).
Several issues remain open, in particular the way how the fact that an organisation perpetrated serious human
rights violations should be established and whether this fact can be fixed in law.
In its early opinions on lustration laws the Venice Commission emphasized importance of the individual guilt
4/6
criterion. Regarding the Albanian lustration the Commission noted that “sanctions are imposed on the basis of
formal criteria, <…> the mere fact of having held one of the offices listed suffices to receive a “verification
certificate B”. This means that “guilt” is not to be proven in each individual case, but will be presumed.” The
Commission specified the scope of proof: “This proof includes both his motivation <…> and his concrete
participation in the violation of human rights.” (para.106).
The amicus curiae brief of 2012 again endorsed the individual guilt requirement.In the interim opinion on the
Ukrainian law the Commission noted that individuals subject to lustration had no possibility to prove that despite
the position they had held they had not engaged in any violations of human rights and had not taken or
supported any anti-democratic measures (para. 65, 106).
But the final opinion this position has undergone a critical change. The proof of individual guilt is no longer a key
criterion of international standards in the field of lustration. The Commission has virtually abandoned this
criterion in its assessment of the law. The government was allowed to determine at its discretion the scope of
permissible presumption of guilt based on affiliation with an organisation. Finally, the Commission did not even
mention the right of those presumed guilty to prove their innocence.
This new approach allows the Ukrainian government to leave intact the core lustration criteria. Under these
criteria a person shall be barred from public service based on a mere fact of holding a certain post in the
administration of President Yanukovich for more than one year or during Maidan events. The opportunity to
prove innocence is not provided. The only exoneration available is voluntary termination of office during the
Maidan events.
Several explanations of the change in Venice Commission’s attitude towards the individual guilt requirement
could be suggested.
The Resolution 1096 and the Guidelines address lustration in the decommunization context, while the Ukraine’s
lustration law (in this part) covers events that took place two decades after the end of communist rule. The
Commission could have concluded that due to this fact the PACE documents were inapplicable to Ukraine.
However, in reality the Commission came to anopposite conclusion (para. 18).
The Commission might have accepted the fact that both the resolution 1096 and the Guidelines were internally
inconsistent as regards the proof of guilt and chose to ignore this criterion at all. However, the final opinion does
not contain any reference to such inconsistencies.
The reduced significance of guilt can be also explained by a shift in the Commission’s understanding of
lustration’s rationale. Without the proof of individual guilt in serious violations of human rights, lustration
transforms into an instrument of political accountability for “collaboration” with an overthrown non-democratic and
repressive regime. Thewording of the final opinion could support this view.The Commission notes that one of the
challenges addressed by the law is non-democratic elites formerly loyal to President Yanukovich (para.27). It
stresses that the state has the right to exclude from the access to public positions those individuals who might
have shown themselves unworthy (sic!) of serving the society (para.30). The use of such terms as “serious
cases of mismanagement” (para.50) and a “misuse of power” (para. 111(d)) while describing the basis of
lustration implies that human rights violations are no longer the sole reason for introduction of lustration.
The Commission’s new approach, while not unprecedented in the European practice (it reminds of the ECtHR
Grand Chamber judgment in Zdanoka vs. Latvia case), virtually legitimates revolutionary justice, allowing post-
revolution governments to exclude the overthrown elites from public sector. However, even after the “green light”
of the Venice Commission, the Ukraine’s law on government cleansing will be probably scrutinized by other
international human rights bodies, including the European Court of Human Rights and the supervisory
mechanisms of the International Labour Organization.
LICENSED UNDER CC BY NC ND
SUGGESTED CITATION  Bobrinsky, Nikolai: Lustration and guilt: Evolution of the Venice Commission’s
approach, VerfBlog, 2015/7/11, http://verfassungsblog.de/lustration-and-guilt-evolution-of-the-venice-
5/6
commissions-approach/.
6/6
